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The Power of Religion: Methodological 





Joseph Campbell was a well-known figure in the world of mythological 
studies. His seminal work in the field, The Hero with A Thousand Faces, 
was widely read, and immediately prior to his death in 1987 his general 
popularity was enhanced by way of a series of interviews conducted at 
George Lucas’ Skywalker Ranch by the journalist Bill Moyers. The 
location for these interviews may have owed something to Lucas’ debt to 
Campbell’s work, Lucas having previously identified Campbell’s account 
of the hero-myth as a major inspiration for his films. This example shows 
the extent and nature of Campbell’s reach into popular culture, but while 
Campbell’s monomyth certainly seems to have given Lucas and others a 
frame on which to hang their dramatic narratives, there is a theme running 
through Campbell’s work that I believe also contributes to his enduring 
popularity in the West. That theme is a religious one. The perspective that 
explains and ultimately unifies the various stories that Campbell might 
characterise as mythic or religious is a kind of secular religiosity with its 
roots in Western individualism and modern psychology. Quite apart from 
Campbell’s gifts as an author, and the penetration of his ideas into popular 
culture, it is this implicit transcendentalism that explains much of his 
enduring appeal. 
Religion itself is a well-known conundrum, not merely for its great 
diversity of ideas and practices, but also because of the semantic 
evasiveness of the word. That diversity is part of the problem, of course: by 
what rule do we say that two or more otherwise distinct cultural practices 
are versions of the same thing? Consideration of religion as an identifiable 
and generalisable phenomenon begins by presuming certain characteristics 
to be universal of it, a move lying at the heart of any comparative method. 
                                                
1 Paris Mawby completed his PhD in Studies in Religion at The University of Sydney. He 
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The first “comparative religionist,” as Eric J. Sharpe put it, “was the first 
worshipper of a god or gods who asked himself… why his neighbour 
should be a worshipper of some other god or gods,”2 and Campbell was, 
first of all, a comparativist. In his youth, he noticed how similar the myths 
of Native American cultures were to the stories of his own Catholicism 
and, so the story goes, this observation is what inspired him to his mature 
work as a mythologist. The Hero with A Thousand Faces explicitly 
identifies a monomyth lying behind a vast array of heroic tales, and it is the 
religious dimension of these unifying themes of Campbell’s that I am 
considering in this article. But there is that word again: “religion.” 
No single article can put to rest the disputes over its proper 
meaning, but it is important to mention that while the controversy will 
necessarily complicate an understanding of how Campbell intends the word 
“religion,” there are habits of use that suggest what he had in mind. On one 
level the words “religion” and “mythology” are to Campbell two versions 
of the same thing, and both words have positive implications for him. 
When he speaks of religion pejoratively, however, he intends an 
institutional, typically Western, meaning of the word because, more 
optimistically and in contrast, mythology derives its power and potential 
from its responsiveness and adaptability to human experience. Life places 
demands on us and will, in one way or another, bestow eternal truths by 
way of historical accidents, and mythology’s capacity to reflect and adapt 
to this is what makes it of benefit to mankind. Religion in the institutional 
sense, is a potential obstacle to this due to its tendency to conservatism and 
ossification, and Campbell sees these problems more characteristic of 
religious forms of the West, than the East. 
Our way of thinking in the West sees God as the final source or cause of 
the energies and wonder of the universe. But in most Oriental thinking, 
and in primal thinking also, the gods are rather manifestations and 
purveyors of an energy that is finally impersonal.3 
A more positive religiosity, and hence religion, is possible for Campbell, 
despite his reservations about many of its historical forms. In the end, 
“religion” can mean for Campbell an internalisation of those destructive 
institutional forces, or it can describe the kind of enriching insight that 
characterises the best myths, the worthier religions and, to him, the best 
                                                
2 Eric J. Sharpe, Comparative Religion: A History (London: Duckworth, 1992), p. 1. See 
also E. O. James, Comparative Religion (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1961), p. v. 
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kind of comparativism: the kind that sees not only mundane explanations 
for universal “mythological and religious themes, but also that addresses 
questions of “ultimate concern,” as Paul Tillich would have it.  
William James’ broad characterisation of religiosity as any state of 
mind that relates the believer to the believer’s idea of divinity4  is a 
reasonable analogue for what Campbell intends by the word in its more 
optimistic sense, but where James was always quite open about his 
(sometimes equivocal) belief in the value and usefulness of religious 
attitudes, Campbell’s professed lack of belief perhaps distracts from a 
deeper methodological sympathy. I will return to James’ possible influence 
on Campbell later in this article, but for now it is worth noting that it is this 
kind of religiosity that Campbell expresses and which marks him as a 
perennialist in the field of religious theory. 
 
Myth and Religion 
Although Campbell’s passion was specifically mythological, his related 
religious interests are important to acknowledge, not least of all because he 
frequently addressed the religion-question directly. For Campbell, 
misunderstood mythology was only part of a class of problems that 
included humanity’s often-misguided religiosity as well; and the benefits 
properly religious insights could bestow were available by way of the same 
interpretive methods he brought specifically to the study of mythology. 
While for Campbell a certain type of religiosity was little more than 
mythology misunderstood, elsewhere he endorses a methodological re-
appropriation of religious ideas in service to his broader program for human 
flourishing. In this sense, both religion and mythology can serve legitimate 
human interests. 
It may seem ironic that while Campbell was suspicious of many 
religions his reading of mythology helped him arrive at apparently religious 
conclusions, but this is to ignore the implicitly religious ideas that underpin 
                                                
4 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Random House, 1929), 
pp. 480-481 and 493: “The pivot round which the religious life… revolves, is the interest of 
the individual in his private personal destiny. Religion, in short, is a monumental chapter in 
the history of human egotism… Today, quite as much as at any previous age, the religious 
individual tells you that the divine meets him on the basis of his personal concerns… 
Religion, occupying herself with personal destinies and keeping thus in contact with the 
only absolute realities which we know, must necessarily play an eternal part in human 
history.” 
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his generalisations. Quite naturally, his comparative mythology work relies 
on there being enduring ideas to which many otherwise disparate 
mythologies refer, and these ideas are very often religious in nature. Take, 
for example, his analysis of this recurring theme: 
What is the meaning of the virgin birth? In India, there is this system of 
the kundalini, as it’s called, the idea of the centres, psychological centres 
up the spine. And they represent the psychological planes of concern 
and consciousness and action… Now, in each of these centres there is a 
symbolic form. At the base, the first one, there is the form of the lingam 
and yoni, the male and female organs in conjunction. At the heart 
chakra, there is again the male and female organs in conjunction, but in 
gold. This is the virgin birth. It’s the birth of spiritual man out of the 
animal man.5 
While these mythological expressions can be as varied as there are people 
to have them, there are nevertheless eternal and universal truths of human 
import to which these expressions refer. With a striking religious tone, 
Campbell insists that such insights are not merely personal or cultural but 
refer to universal human truths: 
The life of mythology derives from the vitality of its symbols as 
metaphors delivering, not simply the idea, but a sense of actual 
participation in such a realisation of transcendence, infinity, and 
abundance, as this of which the upanishadic authors tell. Indeed, the first 
and most essential service of a mythology is this one, of opening the 
mind and heart to the utter wonder of all being.6 
One of the interesting and, perhaps, compelling things about Campbell is 
how he portrays the typically cryptic spirituality of the modern secularist. 
Despite what are manifestly religious pronouncements, Campbell 
characteristically avoids explicit supernatural claims whenever he can. 
While a mythological idea is always a metaphor for human spiritual 
potential, any experience of the eternal is there to be had in the here and 
now, “and nowhere else… If you don’t experience it here and now, you’re 
not going to get it in heaven.”7 
Although Campbell said many things suggesting sympathy with the 
notion of enduring consciousness—though not necessarily enduring 
personality—he believed that the clearest benefits of mythology were for 
the lives with which we are most familiar. Part of the function of myth is to 
                                                
5 Flowers, The Power of Myth, p. 174. 
6 Joseph Campbell, The Inner Reaches of Outer Space: Metaphor as Myth and Religion 
(New York: Harper Collins, 1988), p. 18. 
7 Flowers, The Power of Myth, p. 223. 
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facilitate the successful integration of individuals with communities, but the 
modern world of rapid social change presents obstacles to this important 
function. While myths may have offered for thousands of years crucial 
insights to the society from which they arose, today’s societies are far too 
diverse and inconstant to allow for this. In the past, myths had time to 
evolve and reflexively nurture their parent cultures, but the modern world 
presented to Campbell a new problem: 
I don’t think there can ever be a general comprehensive mythology. For 
there to be a shared mythology there must be a shared body of 
experiences. In small horizon-bound societies everyone was immersed 
in the same social and visual reality … But our contemporary world is so 
heterogeneous that few people share the same experiences. Pluralism 
makes a unifying myth impossible. But if we cannot reinstate such a 
mythology we can, at least, return to the source from which mythology 
springs—the creative imagination.8 
For mythology to continue to serve humanity, Campbell’s ultimate 
recommendation was for human beings to see beyond their culturally-
bound religious personas in order to gain insight into the universal spiritual 
potential which is their birth-right. Of the telos of such insight Campbell 
was content to concede that this was, in principle, unknowable, which 
reflects his methodological debt to the classic distinction between the 
Occidental and Oriental, and his preference for the latter. Campbell had a 
clear preference for Eastern mythology because of its tendency to offer 
symbols as temporal inflections of a higher, hidden significance. 9 
Modernisation itself has driven the mythological work entirely inward, and 
to Campbell’s way of thinking the Eastern model is a more reliable 
metaphor for human psychology in general, and thus a more suitable model 
for spiritual growth. 
As was shown earlier, it was this model that he applied when 
interpreting the universal significance of virgin-birth stories, and he used it 
frequently as a psychological framework to explain human behaviour: 
either according to more fundamental, animal imperatives; or in ways 
reflective of more spiritual objectives. Campbell discussed this in a paper 
entitled “Metaphors of Psychological Transformation.” 
In the normal course of a well-favoured human lifetime the unfolding of 
the body’s vital energy transpires though marked stages of transformation 
                                                
8 Sam Keen, ‘Man and Myth: a Conversation with Joseph Campbell’, Psychology Today vol. 
56 (July 1971), pp. 35-39, 86-95. 
9 Flowers, The Power of Myth, pp. 208-209. 
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which in the pictographic lexicon of India’s yogic schools are represented 
as controlled from separate spinal centres known as chakras.10 
Every person has within the potential to act from one or more of these 
psychological centres; to behave with regard to the merely expedient, as 
characterised by the first three chakras: 
These, and these alone, have supplied the motivations of historical man, 
his effective moral systems, and his nightmare of world history. They 
are the centres of the basic urges, furthermore, that mankind shares with 
the beasts—namely, (1) to survive alive by feeding on other lives, (2) to 
generate offspring, and (3) to conquer and subdue. Unrestrained by any 
control system, these become devastating, as the history of the present 
century surely tells.11 
Or to act in a manner that is, as Campbell would have it, more properly 
human; more spiritual: 
The transformation of character that is prerequisite for living in the light 
of a transformed world is symbolised in the imagery of the yogic lotus 
ladder by a final triad of chakras—numbers 5, 6, and 7—which are of the 
head and mind pursuing aims and ends beyond range of the physical 
senses.12 
The intermediate, fourth, “heart chakra” is the point of transformation; of 
movement from the purely animal to the genuinely human; the golden 
chakra of the virgin birth. The birth of the spiritual life from merely carnal 
is represented by the chakra-system here, and by miraculous births in other 
traditions. It is at this point, for Campbell, that authentically religious 
contemplation begins. For him, it is the point of awakening to compassion. 
Campbell’s debt to depth psychology will be covered later, but for 
now the point may be prefaced by noting that his belief in the validity of 
the final two chakras of the kundalini system marks an important departure 
from his otherwise sympathetically Jungian approach. It also reveals an 
unapologetically mystical strain in his work. In “speaking of the death of 
the ego,” Segal points out, 
Campbell reveals that he is not a Jungian after all. He is a mystic. His 
interpretation remains psychological, and his brand of psychology is far 
more Jungian than Freudian, but it is finally not Jungian… Campbell 
himself recognizes that neither Jung nor Freud espouses a return to sheer 
unconsciousness. He contrasts the typical Eastern goal, the dissolution 
                                                
10 Campbell, The Inner Reaches of Outer Space, p. 63. 
11 Campbell, The Inner Reaches of Outer Space, p. 63. 
12 Campbell, The Inner Reaches of Outer Space, p. 66. 
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of the ego itself, to the conventional Western one, represented by Jung 
as well as Freud.13 
Despite Campbell’s great reliance on the work of the depth psychologists, 
his method goes further to explicitly incorporate idiomatic religious 
insights; and contrary to the suggestion that such an approach distorts the 
subject matter, in step with humanist psychology, the conscious testimony 
of the believer is taken seriously by Campbell insofar as it serves an 
ultimately perennialist agenda. In this way, religion is seen to be potentially 
beneficial for the same reasons that mythology, read properly, can be said 
to be so. 
To Campbell, every person has a spiritual potential realisable 
within the life he or she must presently endure: “All religions, all 
mythologies are true in this sense.”14 Eastern religions, with their tendency 
to represent ultimate and impenetrable mysteries by way of temporal 
analogies—to be aware of their symbols as symbols—were more in keeping 
with his expectations of what religion could do for us: encode the ultimate 
mysteries of human spiritual potential. In contrast, Western religious 
traditions, by and large, were disappointing for Campbell because of their 
tendency to literalise, historicise, and misread the local analogy as the final 
and unambiguous message. 
In sympathy with earlier theorists anxious to claim speculative 
territory from religion, Campbell accepts that as the natural sciences 
explain more of what was previously couched in religious doctrine 
religion’s purchase upon history becomes more tenuous. But instead of 
regarding this progression as proof of religion’s eventual irrelevance,15 
Campbell takes this as evidence of the essentially metaphorical nature of 
religious discourse, and of its merely implicit metaphysical possibilities. 
On the post-mortem ascents of Jesus and Mary he has this to say: 
What is connoted by such metaphorical voyages is the possibility of a 
return of the mind in spirit, while still incarnate, to full knowledge of 
that transcendent source out of which the mystery of a given life arises 
into this field of time and back into what time dissolves … The imagery 
is necessarily physical and thus apparently of outer space. The inherent 
                                                
13 Segal, Joseph Campbell: An Introduction (New York: Penguin, 1990), p. 58. 
14 Flowers, The Power of Myth, p. 209. 
15 This is perhaps one of Campbell’s more positive contributions to the discussion of 
religion against a broadly atheistic worldview. He is essentially reductionist without being 
dismissive, not least of all because his interpretations are essentially religious. Again, for the 
modern spiritual-but-not-religious individual this holds obvious appeal. 
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connotation is always, however, psychological and metaphysical, which 
is to say of inner space.16 
The ascension represents a psychological process with a view to 
metaphysical realisations; a fairly typical Campbellian reading, complete 
with the usual post-Enlightenment (post-Kantian, really) metaphysical 
undercurrents informing an essentially psychological reading. Others have 
drawn persuasive parallels between Campbell’s interpretive habits to his 
earlier academic work in literary analysis,17 exchanging poetic implication 
for post-Kantian psychoanalysis, and presuming, perhaps, that the raw 
material of religious imagery is the only-partly revealed machinations of a 
universal human psyche. 
Whether or not the parallel is perfect, Campbell clearly believes he 
is onto something that believers themselves may have missed. Quite 
naturally, then, religious traditions that remain stubbornly literalist, 
refusing to read between the lines, lie outside of Campbell’s consideration 
as a religious theorist. To be religious in any positive sense is to see beyond 
religion to an ineffable point at which all legitimate religiosity begins. 
Again, in sympathy with William James, Campbell believes that a very 
particular, and irreducibly personal, insight lies at the heart of all religion, 
whether or not the subsequent traditions do justice to that fact. Creation 
myths, stories of incredible births, transformations, multi-limbed figures, 
and super-sonic ascensions to Heaven are both ridiculous in a naturalistic 
universe and immensely enriching if read as metaphors for processes within 
the mind of an appropriately religious individual. Thus, for Campbell, all 
human beings share a cross-cultural potential for this kind of—essentially 
Eastern, if you ask him—type of religiosity. 
 
Anti-Religion, Antisemitic? 
In addition to the crime of religious literalism, institutions that claim to be 
in unique possession of religious truth Campbell clearly found offensive. 
This may seem hypocritical; Campbell is, after all, offering a universally 
legitimate interpretation of all religion and myth. What may save 
Campbell—as much as it distinguishes him from Jung—is his conviction 
that the ultimate reference of religious insight is, by definition, 
                                                
16 Campbell, The Inner Reaches of Outer Space, p. 31. 
17 See Joseph Campbell and Henry Morton Robinson, A Skeleton Key to Finnegan’s Wake: 
Unlocking James Joyce’s Masterpiece (Novato, CA: New World Library, 2005 [1944]). 
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unknowable. His claim to know the mind of God is that we cannot know 
the mind of God. Obviously, the claim to universal truth occurs in West 
and East alike but, again, because religions of the East often lend 
themselves more easily to metaphorical interpretation, Campbell’s 
vehemence on this point was focused on the West. More specifically, as 
Segal notes, 
Campbell asserts that mainstream Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, 
together with ancient Greek and Roman religions, systematically 
misconstrue their own myths. While he grants correct interpretations by 
marginal, heterodox movements like Gnosticism, he argues that in the 
West conventional believers have systematically been indoctrinated in a 
false understanding of myth.18 
And subsequently duped of any truly elevating religious insight. By 
drawing upon religious undercurrents in the West, Campbell is able to 
extend his examples of a universal, non-literal, religiosity beyond the 
Orient. Campbell exploits the interrelationship between Gnosticism and 
early Christianity—particularly as it occurs in the Gnostic gospels—because 
of its recurring theme that the believer should look for the divine within. 
Islamic interpretations of Christian texts, and medieval grail-legends 
likewise receive praise from Campbell for the ease with which they may be 
used to a similar purpose. Conspicuously, however, of the major Western 
religions, Campbell makes little use of Jewish examples that would just as 
easily fit his theoretical framework.19 This notable avoidance of Jewish 
subject-matter speaks to the most serious attack made against his 
reputation, both as a humanitarian and as a theorist: that he harboured anti-
Semitic prejudices. 
It has to be said that antisemitism sits uneasily beside Campbell’s 
otherwise apparently humanitarian outlook – although sadly this is often 
the twisted logic of prejudice. Segal suggests that part of Campbell’s 
problem may have been generational, but while he may well have been 
“brought up to regard Jews [uncharitably],”20 he was likewise nurtured by 
a culture that has long championed (at least on paper) the universal dignity 
and equality of all human beings. We might easily suppose a tension in 
                                                
18  Robert A. Segal, ‘Myth Versus Religion for Campbell’, in Uses of Comparative 
Mythology: Essays on the Work of Joseph Campbell, ed. Kenneth L. Golden (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1992), p. 41. 
19 Segal, ‘J. Campbell on Jews and Judaism’, Religion, vol. 22 (1992), p. 157. 
20 Segal, ‘J. Campbell on Jews and Judaism’, p. 163. 
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Campbell between his antisemitism and his broadly humanist beliefs. 
Certainly there are many examples of a more generous outlook in his 
work.21 Campbell’s own thoughts on the matter suggest his suspicion of 
Judaism is more theoretical than prejudicial. When being told by a Jewish 
student that her identity resides primarily in her Jewishness, Campbell’s 
response is textbook individualism: “Rachel,” says Campbell, “I never 
thought of you as Jewish or anything else, but as Rachel. Suppose I were to 
say to you, ‘If I didn’t think of myself as Irish, I wouldn’t know my 
identity’. That wouldn’t make sense, would it?”22 
Campbell does not want anything to get in the way of the 
individual’s direct and authentic engagement with “the ultimate ground of 
all being,” as he would put it. While his antisemitism seems in doubt, his 
suspicion of the coercive power of human institutions, even to the point 
where that power affects exclusively religious matters, is not; and this from 
an atheist! While it is interesting to speculate about which direction the 
influence runs, we can do little more than that. Certainly, both are possible: 
his familial antisemitism may have driven his theoretical bias toward 
personal autonomy, or his love of individualism may fuel a distrust of 
religions which resemble the Jewish example: culturally and 
metaphysically exclusive claims to absolute Truth. His strenuous 
individualism emerges repeatedly in his writing, and alongside stories of 
Campbell’s outrageous prejudice we must, in fairness, consider those who 
report that he was remarkably free from such.23 In the end, competing 
stories such as these can make us no more than uncomfortable and 
equivocal. More important for the current discussion is how antisemitism 
shows itself in Campbell’s theories about the nature of religion, if at all. 
                                                
21  Despite believing in Campbell’s essentially antisemitic bias, Sandler and Reeck 
acknowledge his more humanitarian side: “The Hero with a Thousand Faces impresses the 
reader by its generosity of spirit and particularly by the way in which it presents, as a 
counter to pettiness, hostility, and ‘man’s inhumanity to man,’ the Avalokitesvara Buddha 
whose overcoming of ego allows for his compassionate identification with all beings.” 
Florence Sandler and Darrell Reeck, ‘The Masks of Joseph Campbell’, Religion, vol. 11 
(1981), p. 9. 
22 Joseph Campbell, Transformations of Myth Through Time (New York: Harper and Row, 
1990), p. 91. 
23 See, for example, Robin Larsen and Stephen Larsen, Joseph Campbell. A Fire in the 
Mind: The Authorized Biography (Vermont: Inner Traditions, 2002), pp. 510-511. 
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As mentioned, one way of viewing Campbell’s attitude to Judaism 
is that it is a conspicuous example of what he disliked about Western 
religiosity in general, remembering his broad characterisation of Western 
religion as being overly parochial and literalistic. Certainly, a reading of 
Judaism in these terms is possible: 
As stated unequivocally in II Kings 5:15, “There is no god in all the 
earth but in Israel.” For at that time the center of the universe was 
Jerusalem. And the center of Jerusalem was the Temple. And the centre 
of the Temple was the Holy of Holies in the Temple. And the center of 
the Holy of Holies was the Ark of the Covenant therein. And the 
foundation of the universe was the Stone that was there before the Ark. 
Mythologically, metaphorically, that was a perfectly good cultic image. 
But it had nothing to do with the universe, or with the rest of the peoples 
of this planet.24 
Campbell then proceeds to discuss how diaspora Judaism relocated its 
spiritual centre in race rather than place, merely shifting the locus of this 
particular kind of religious hubris.25 Elsewhere he does make more positive 
use of Jewish mysticism, extracting from it the same kind of life-affirming 
mythological core,26 but not to the degree to which he makes use of the 
heretical strains in other, otherwise problematic, religious traditions. 
Despite a comparable rich variety in the history of Jewish religiosity, 
Campbell seems content to conspicuously ignore those Jewish examples 
that lend themselves to his more positive interpretation of religion’s 
potential. 
Using this ignored perspective, Judaism is indeed potentially 
compatible with Campbell’s religious ideals. It has even been suggested 
that Judaism itself plays an important role in the development of the 
Western individualism of which Campbell is so fond: 
The remarkable resemblances among Roman law, present-day American 
law, and Jewish jurisprudence in Biblical days is more than mere 
coincidence. The Jews devised, four centuries before Christ, a legal 
system based on the dignity of man and individual equality before the 
                                                
24 Campbell, The Inner Reaches of Outer Space, p. 32. 
25 Sam Keen, who interviewed Campbell on several occasions for the magazine Psychology 
Today in 1971, is of a similar opinion: “You have to remember that Joseph grew up loving 
mythology and loving the plurality of the stories. So he was naturally offended by that single 
instance in human history [the Judaeo-Christian tradition] where plurality is taken as 
idolatry.” Larsen and Larsen, A Fire in the Mind, p. 513. 
26 Segal, ‘J. Campbell on Jews and Judaism’, p. 158. 
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law, while Europe still had trial by ordeal as late as the fifteenth 
century.27 
To ignore the Jewish contribution to modern humanism is an ironic 
oversight, to say the least, for such a squarely—albeit mystical—humanist 
reinterpreter of religiosity itself. Of all the evidence suggesting that 
Campbell was anti-Semitic, his failure to adequately treat Jewish religiosity 
with equivalent charity is arguably the most suggestive. It implies either 
that he could not treat that particular subject dispassionately, or that he 
unreflectively rejected the positive influence of Jewish culture upon the 
West. To Campbell’s essentially Western perennialism, Judaism apparently 
had next to nothing to contribute. Critics further suggest that Campbell’s 
very methodology is anti-Semitic to the core. Sandler and Reeck offer one 
of the most unforgiving characterisations along such lines, arguing that 
to differentiate the freedom-loving, non-state-forming Germano-Celtic 
type from the state-and-priest-ridden Levantine is so transparent a 
revival of the old prejudice of Aryan culture against Jewish that one 
blushes for an author so disingenuous, especially when that author 
knows and deplores Nazi politics.28 
But perhaps they go too far. Naturally, Campbell’s rejection of orthodoxy 
has anti-Semitic potential, but given that Campbell was hostile to any 
“state-and-priest-ridden” orthodoxy, it is too much to conclude that his 
theories are, at heart, racist. 
A key difference between mythology and our Judaeo-Christian religion 
is that the imagery of mythology is rendered with humor. You realise 
that the image is symbolic of something. You’re at a distance from it. 
But in our religion, everything is prosaic, and very, very serious. You 
can’t fool around with Yahweh.29 
Campbell’s assault is not uniquely directed at Judaism as the attitude of 
prosaic seriousness is cross-cultural. Clearly, a historical and reflexive 
attitude antithetical to Campbell’s entire outlook is not likely to be met with 
any favour, Jewish or not. But that in itself is suggestive: The fact that 
Judaism historically expresses the worst kind of religious impulses, to 
Campbell, suggests that Campbell had a personal stake in the religious 
question: that he cared about the kind of conclusions that were drawn in 
                                                
27 Max I. Dimont, Jews, God and History (New York: The New American Library, 1962), p. 
80. 
28 Sandler and Reeck, ‘The Masks of Joseph Campbell’, p. 15. 
29 Flowers, The Power of Myth, p. 220. 
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religious matters. Given how much religiosity there is in his 
comparativism, this would hardly be surprising. 
The question naturally becomes, if we accept Campbell’s explicit 
atheism, and his potentially prejudicial stance on certain religious forms, 
what is the nature and source of the crypto-religiosity that drives so much 
of his interpretive work? There are at least two identifiable influences 
which resonate with Campbell’s methodology: the early psychological 
work that paralleled Campbell’s development as a scholar, and the 
romanticism and individualism of his own culture which Campbell himself 
linked to its mythological roots. 
 
The Influence of Psychology and Psychoanalysis  
Campbell is frequently compared with Carl Gustav Jung, and it is not hard 
to see why. He shares with Jung a fascination with mythological tropes, and 
both theorists are interested in how individuals and societies adapt to myth. 
Campbell was also very involved with the Eranos conferences, which were 
quickly taken over, in spirit, by Jung and his followers. Like many of the 
attendants at Eranos, Campbell came away reassured of the value of Jung’s 
psychological approach to questions of religiosity and myth, and Campbell 
later edited the assembled Eranos papers into a six-volume selection. Jung’s 
response to Campbell’s work was also favourable.30 Most significantly 
perhaps, the depth psychology that runs through Campbell’s work is more 
akin to Jung than any other psychologist of that school; and, like Jung, 
Campbell begins his work by noticing the pattern of similarities among 
different cultures. In the final of his PBS interviews with Bill Moyers, 
Campbell positions himself alongside Jung rather than as his successor by 
identifying a common theoretical ancestor: Adolf Bastian, whose 
“elementary ideas” influence both Jung and Campbell’s broadly 
                                                
30 Not long after their meeting in 1953, Campbell sent Jung a copy of The Hero with a 
Thousand Faces. Jung wrote in reply, “Thank you ever so much for kindly sending me your 
very beautiful book. I had already seen it before and have duly admired it. You are certainly 
shaping after my late friend Heinrich Zimmer. It is the same style and outlook. I am glad to 
have made your personal acquaintance this summer.” Ritske Rensma, The Innateness of 
Myth: A New Interpretation of Joseph Campbell’s Reception of C.G. Jung (London and 
New York: Continuum, 2009), p. 88. 
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psychological approach. 31  Nevertheless, Campbell did draw upon the 
refinements of the Jungian model.32 
Sigmund Freud’s theories do not seem to have been as instrumental in 
forming Campbell’s mature thought, and it is fair to say that he relies on Freud 
only as far as Jung himself would have done.33 Although there is nothing in 
Campbell’s writing to suggest the kind euhemerism of Freud’s earlier work on 
religious origins,34 Campbell does cite, with reservation, Freud’s Moses and 
Monotheism in his Masks of God series. Keeping in mind Campbell’s dislike of 
religious literalism, and his predilection for cultural decoding, he is 
sympathetic to comparable efforts by Freud to unmask the profound secret of 
the myth of Moses. For Campbell, religion is capable of providing genuine 
insight into the human situation, but he is also more than willing to entertain 
Freud’s idea that it is the practice of neurotics in certain cases: 
[A]ccording to [Freud’s] by no means unlearned view, it furnishes the only 
plausible psychological explanation of the peculiarly compulsive character 
of biblical belief, which is in striking contrast to the relaxed, poetic, and 
even playful approaches to mythology of the Greeks of the same period.35 
Biblical religion, according to Freud, has the character of a neurosis, where a 
screen of mythic figurations hides a repressed conviction of guilt, which it is 
felt, must be atoned, and yet cannot be consciously faced.36 
                                                
31 In his later work, Campbell seems to equate them more directly: “The Buddhists speak of 
Buddha Realms. These are planes and orders of consciousness that can be brought to mind 
through meditations of appropriately mythologized forms. Plato tells of universal ideas, the 
memory of which is lost a birth but through philosophy may be recalled. These correspond to 
Bastian’s ‘Elementary Ideas’ and Jung’s ‘Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious’.” Campbell, 
The Inner Reaches of Outer Space, p. 31. 
32 “Campbell holds that Bastian’s hierarchy of Elementary Ideas is essential, but believes that 
depth psychology, as initiated by Freud and Jung, now makes it possible to go beyond Bastian’s 
mere listing and description of the Elementary Ideas to a study of their biological roots.” Marc 
Manganaro, Myth, Rhetoric, and the Voice of Authority (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1992), p. 169, quoting from Campbell’s essay ‘Bios and Mythos’. 
33 Lesser known than Jung’s ‘collective unconscious’, for example, are equivalent ideas in 
Freud’s psychological model. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the 
Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics (London: Penguin, 1938), p. 157. 
34 Freud, Totem and Taboo, passim. 
35 Notice Campbell’s characterisation of Greek belief. In his survey of religions, he favours those 
societies that take this kind of ‘poetic’ attitude to their religions. This tendency is historically apt 
when we consider that in contrast to the religious legalism and divinely ordered societies of 
Hebraic cultures, those societies with a distant and philosophical eye on their own religions are 
perhaps the earliest examples of what we now call “comparative religion.” See Sharpe, 
Comparative Religion, p. 7. Campbell, in this sense, is methodologically, perhaps self-
consciously, recapitulating sympathetic historical religious themes. 
36 Joseph Campbell, Masks of God: Occidental Mythology (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p. 
126. 
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Freud’s opinion is at least superficially similar to Campbell’s, which suggests a 
relationship to the younger man’s work and the depth psychology that grew in 
parallel with his own theoretical development. Should we perhaps consider 
both Campbell and Jung the theoretical twin-offspring of Bastian and Freud? 
While it is plausible to suggest that Campbell need not have been directly 
influenced by Freud, it is implausible to suppose that the immense influence of 
the Viennese psychoanalyst would not have made an impression, and Campbell 
was certainly content to characterise Freud as “one of the bravest creative 
spirits of our day.”37 
For reasons already mentioned, the link is clearer with Jung, even if by 
way of Bastian. But it is important to recognise that Campbell’s similarity to 
Jung is not as complete, or exclusive, as it might appear. That religious 
dimension distinguishes Campbell from Jung in ways that Segal has suggested, 
and there is a phenomenological dimension to Campbell’s work in keeping 
with other psychological work on religion that predate Jung’s popularity in the 
field. In addition to the depth psychologists already discussed, there are 
correspondences in Campbell’s work to the ideas of an earlier type of 
psychology exemplified in figures such as James H. Leuba (1868-1946), 
Edwin Diller Starbuck (1866-1947) and, again, William James (1842-1910). 
Although Campbell’s structural approach is partly ratified by the insights of 
depth psychology, he is also interested in the psychology of the believer as is 
manifests consciously, as it was for these members of the humanist school of 
psychological theory. In contrast with Leuba, and more like Starbuck and 
James, Campbell also concedes the possibility of the transcendental to which 
the belief refers, which is, of course, the contra-Jungian distinction noted by 
Segal. Campbell often betrayed his religious sympathies by his selective use of 
religious testimony. The following are Campbell’s words, discussing the 
Native American mystic Black Elk. 
[H]e had seen himself standing on the central mountain of the world, which 
in his view, of course, was nowhere near Jerusalem, but Harney Peak, in the 
Black Hills of South Dakota. And while there, “I was seeing in a sacred 
manner,” he said, “the shapes of all things in the spirit, and the shape of all 
things as they must live together, like one being. And I saw the sacred hoop 
of my people was one of many hoops that made one circle, wide as daylight 
and as starlight, and in the centre grew one mighty flowering tree to shelter 
all the children of one mother and one father.” There, I would say, was a 
true prophet, who knew the difference between his ethnic ideas and the 
elementary ideas that they enclose, between a metaphor and its connotation, 
between a tribal myth and its metaphorical import.38 
                                                
37 Campbell, Masks of God: Occidental Mythology, p. 127. 
38 Campbell, The Inner Reaches of Outer Space, pp. 33-34. 
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Campbell habitually favoured prophets and mystics whose insights lent 
themselves to a universalist interpretation. The stubbornly parochial forms of 
religious devotion Campbell saw as examples of religion failing in its 
responsibility for human enrichment. For a religion to work as a transmitter of 
mythic ideas (ideas that spoke to the human condition and that were 
legitimately transformative) the message may be coined in the local tongue, but 
it must be pregnant with universal significance and open to that interpretative 
dimension. As far as the conscious beliefs of the religious affect Campbell’s 
theories, he clearly favours those who fit a pre-determined metaphysical point 
of view, and this kind of selectiveness, it must be admitted, weakens 
Campbell’s affinity with humanist psychology because it arbitrarily jettisons 
much of its raw material. A portion, at least, of the unique religious point-of-
view remains methodologically essential for Campbell, even while it remains 
but a portion.  
In his final interview for the PBS series, Campbell discussed 
transpersonal psychologist Abraham Maslow with reference to Maslow’s 
influential theory of B-type cognition and “peak experiences.” From 
Campbell’s perspective, 
[t]he peak experience refers to actual moments of your life when you 
experience your relationship to the harmony of Being. My own peak 
experiences, the ones that I knew were peak experiences after I had them, all 
came in athletics.39 
Maslow included in his list of possible peak experiences both religious and 
secular rapture, and Campbell’s argument that the rewards of religion (properly 
conceived) were attainable by anyone with a suitable attitude to any life-
experience is certainly one that conforms to Maslow’s cognitive model. 
Lacking any conventional religious experiences of his own, a Maslow-type 
experience may have been as close an empathy Campbell expected with the 
authentically religious. His own “peak experiences” occurred in his life as a 
young athlete, and however much transcendentalism there is in Campbell’s 
thought, the earthly, bodily component of religious sensibility is never far 
away: 
People say that what we’re all seeking is a meaning for life. I don’t think 
that’s what we’re really seeking. I think that what we’re seeking is an 
experience of being alive, so that our life experiences on the purely physical 
plane will have resonances within our own innermost being and reality, so 
that we actually feel the rapture of being alive.40 
                                                
39 Flowers, The Power of Myth, p. 220. 
40 Flowers, The Power of Myth, p. 5. 
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Campbell, without ever being formally religious beyond his boyhood 
Catholicism, seemed to have an interest in understanding (and not merely by 
analogy) what the religiously devout might be experiencing.41 His approach 
expresses the individualism and emphasis on personal experience that persists 
in the West to this day, and was certainly part of the zeitgeist from which 
humanist psychology sprung.42 Indeed, individualism can be said to lie at the 
heart of his religious interpretation. The ease with which Eastern religious 
models can be made to conform to Western individualism may go some way to 
explaining Campbell’s privileging of the Oriental perspective. As Sharpe puts 
it, “the interest which the Romantics showed in the East was in large measure 
determined by the support which it gave (or appeared to give) for a certain kind 
of individual, intuitive philosophy of life.”43 
 
Romanticism and Individualism 
Indeed, for Campbell, the Romance tradition of twelfth century Europe 
explains much of what is characteristic of Western culture. He characterises the 
Romantic tradition as a crucial transitional moment in Western civilisation; 
shifting from allegiance to tradition to what we now commonly assume as 
appropriate (even religiously appropriate) personal authenticity. In Campbell’s 
words, 
[i]t was important in that it gave the West this accent on the individual, that 
one should have faith in his experience and not simply mouth terms handed 
down to him by others. It stresses the validity of the individual’s experience 
of what humanity is, what life is, what values are, against the monolithic 
system.44 
This theme of personal authenticity over tradition and authority is what he 
identifies in the medieval story of Tristan and Isolde. With European stories 
this is less problematic because a Western individualist interpreting his own 
culture has, at least, a reflexive plausibility. A North American scholar might 
well be intuitively sensitive to the historical precedents of his own culture. But 
to bend a non-western tradition to the same interpretation invites obvious 
                                                
41 Segal notes this peculiarity: “Ironically, Campbell himself was politically conservative; was not 
the least religious; never practiced meditation, let alone took drugs; and above all grasped the 
unconscious meaning of myths through sheer reading rather than through any encounter with the 
unconscious.” Segal, Joseph Campbell: An Introduction, pp. 21-22. 
42 Kirk J. Schneider, ‘The Revival of the Romantic Means a Revival of Psychology’, in The 
Handbook of Humanistic Psychology: Leading Edges in Theory, Research, and Practice, eds 
Kirk J. Schneider, James F.T. Bugental, and J. Fraser Pierson (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001), 
pp. 65-76. 
43 Sharpe, Comparative Religion, p. 24. 
44 Flowers, The Power of Myth, p. 187. 
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problems, unless we presume that a meta-narrative informs these disparate 
stories in exactly the same way that individualism could persist for centuries in 
a more-or-less uniform culture. Again, Sharpe is keenly aware of the problems 
with this kind of comparativism. The adoption of exotic philosophies without 
consideration for history and cultural peculiarities can lead to the worst type of 
theorising: “eclectic, intuitive, frequently inaccurate, [and] resting on the 
foundations of a highly individual personal philosophy.”45 As much has been 
said of Campbell more directly, and the point not only addresses a theoretical 
weakness, it also goes some way to explaining his popularity: he appeals to us 
in the West because he flatters our unconscious prejudices. Those who are 
suspicious of traditional religious institutions and yet regard themselves as 
spiritual are the perfect audience for Campbell. We feel we are seeing behind 
the corrupting, local superficialities to a deeper religious truth—one supposedly 
universal, but which in fact merely suits our unapologetic individualism. 
More sympathetically, perhaps, theorists such as Campbell bring to the 
subject exactly the right kind of insight. Not clumsily imposing the parochial 
on the universal, but rather revealing the universal through the embrasure of 
the inescapably local. After all, it is commonplace to be aware of, and correct 
for, the distorting potential of our own subjectivity, but bootstrapping ourselves 
above our personal and cultural foundations is an ultimately futile enterprise. 
There always remains a residue of indefensible selfhood from which we must 
proceed, but this is not necessarily corrosive to the task of understanding any 
human phenomenon. Parenthood is scrutinised and theorised broadly and 
minutely, but parents understand it in an entirely irreducible way. In the same 
way, there is an aspect of religiosity only open to the religious. From this point 
of view, Campbell’s atheism would be a handicap were it not for his oddly 
religious intuitions.  
Campbell was obviously aware of the strong individualism of his own 
culture (as we have seen, he traces it to the twelfth century and the Romantic 
institution of the troubadours), and he cannot have been so blind to not see the 
individualism and stress on personal authenticity that ran though his own work. 
One of Campbell’s predecessors is interesting in this regard for considering a 
scholar’s own subjectivity to be essential to the work of understanding religion. 
It might even be said that the hermeneutics of Joachim Wach (1898-1955) 
summarise Campbell’s methodology perfectly: 
In principle there could resound in each of us something of the ecstatic, the 
spectral, the unusual—something of that which to us, the children of another 
age, of another race, and of other customs, appears strange among the 
                                                
45 Sharpe, Comparative Religion, p. 24. 
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religious expressions of distant lands. Where this natural disposition is 
developed through training, there also the prerequisite for an actual 
understanding of foreign religiosity exists.46 
What such an approach demands, however, is ‘religious instinct,’ and perhaps 
this was among Campbell’s talents: a capacity for a-religious religiosity. In 
using it unapologetically he consciously ignored the warnings of his peers and 
predecessors. James Bissett Pratt (1875-1944), for example, although he was 
prepared to accept the possible reality of transcendental objects, denied that 
religious empathy could ever be part of a scientific investigation of the 
religious mind: 
[The psychology of religion] must content itself with a description of human 
experience while recognising that there may well be spheres of reality to 
which these experiences refer and with which they are possibly connected, 
which yet cannot be investigated by science.47 
Campbell’s religiously normative appraisal is very distinctive for going beyond 
the merely descriptive, and incorporating the transcultural religious insight he 
implicitly practised, however much he may or may not have believed it 
himself. 
 
A Methodology of Religion/A Religious Methodology 
Campbell certainly seems to have lacked any deliberate bias, quite the 
opposite. What he had was an idea of the spiritual potential of every human 
individual (admittedly, a very Western individual) regardless of the cultural 
inheritance through which this potential must be read. And he did not exclude 
himself in this regard, even to the point of including this general religious 
insight into his methodology. William G. Dotty makes the same observation: 
The fact is that Campbell was ‘doing’ religion all along, but in a non-
religious guise, and he was encouraging readers to follow his example, as we 
could confirm from any number of quotations, as for example: “The images 
of myth are reflections of the spiritual potentialities of every one of us. 
Through contemplating these we evoke the powers in our lives.”48 
What makes Campbell interesting as a theorist is that he is one who attempts to 
accommodate views unique to the subject of his enquiry. In this way he is part 
of that humanist psychology tradition mentioned earlier. 
                                                
46 Joachim Wach, Understanding and Believing, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa (New York: Harper & Row, 
1968), p. 135. 
47 James Bissett Pratt, The Religious Consciousness: A Psychological Study (New York: Macmillan, 
1920), p. 42. 
48 William G. Dotty, ‘Dancing to the Music of the Spheres: The Religion in Joseph Campbell’s 
“Non-Religious” Mythography’, in Paths to the Power of Myth: Joseph Campbell and the Study 
of Religion, ed. Daniel C. Noel (Belleville, MI: Crossroad, 1990), p. 8. 
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The sorts of claims he made concerning the general meaning of 
specific religious expressions require an a priori belief that can easily be called 
“religious.” Indeed, Campbell, on many occasions, was positively mystical 
when discussing the themes he believed to be universally present, as in the 
example that Dotty provides above. Speaking of the study of esotericism, 
Pierre A. Riffard argues that the perspective of the believer is an essential 
compliment to empirical studies, and Campbell’s approach might well be 
considered in this way: 
The external method, essentially historical-critical, has the advantage of 
proceeding on familiar ground, with chronologies, documents, etc., but it has 
the disadvantage of providing information that is, finally, of little relevance 
… The internal method, on the other hand, has the advantage of adhering to 
its object, of speaking the very language of esotericism, not an alien 
language.49 
The facts—or as close as he may come to them—are readily provided by 
empirical research; but to appreciate the meaning of religion it is not always, if 
ever, possible to do so from beyond a world-view framed by the basic beliefs 
of religiosity itself. The historian provides the “how,” the mystic theorist helps 
to impart the “why?” Campbell may be regarded more positively as this kind 
of theorist, with a foot in both camps. 
It is this, in part, that accounts for his enduring popularity. Campbell’s 
theories have obvious appeal to a society as thoroughly secularised as our own 
yet which, perhaps as a reaction, still remains desperately curious about 
questions of ultimate concern. When long-established religious forms no 
longer satisfy this need—moreover, when traditional institutions are considered 
incapable of ever doing so—Campbell’s revisiting of the broadly gnostic brand 
of spirituality with its formula of self-examination is perfectly welcome in a 
society that champions the moral right of the individual as supreme and which 
encourages individual expression at every turn. Again, from Dotty: 
Campbell provided an ostensibly ‘non-religious’ approach to the 
understanding of religious experience at a time when many well-educated 
persons had turned away from formal participation in religious institutions. 
At the same time, there are ample (if sometimes ironic) reasons to see a 
genuinely religious core in his approach and to assess that mythography 
from the standpoint of Religious Studies.50 
More than simply encouraging an ill-considered spiritual hedonism, 
Campbell’s eclecticism exposes his admirers not only to a world of specific 
cultural perspectives on these questions, but also to an important heritage of 
                                                
49 Pierre A. Riffard, ‘The Esoteric Method’, in Gnostica 2: Western Esotericism and the Science 
of Religion, eds Antoine Faivre and Wouter J. Hanegraaff (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), p. 64. 
50 Dotty, ‘Dancing to the Music of the Spheres’, p. 4. 
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theorising on the nature of religion itself. His publications and public lectures 
are highly eclectic, incorporating ideas from such wide-ranging sources as 
Bastian, Kant, Schopenhauer, Joyce, Yeats, and Maslow, amongst others, 
which, although used in unorthodox ways,51 nevertheless readily equips his 
audience with a sense of the breadth of the subject and the range of ideas 
applied to it. What his generalist approach does for us is, at first blush, provide 
a glimpse of the essentially multidimensional quality of both religion itself and 
the theoretical responses to it. Campbell knew he was a generalist, and knew as 
well how this placed him in the opinion of his peers: 
Specialization tends to limit the field of problems that the specialist is 
concerned with. Now, the person who isn’t a specialist, but a generalist like 
myself, sees something over here that he has learned from one specialist, 
something over there that he has learned from another specialist—and neither 
of them has considered the problem of why this occurs here and also there. So 
the generalist—and that’s a derogatory term, by the way, for academics—gets 
into a range of other problems that are more genuinely human, you might say, 
than specifically cultural.52 
To this smorgasbord approach Campbell brought a set of preconceptions that, 
even if derived from a selection of cross-cultural themes, still have the 
potential to distort the data of pure research, especially when the themes 
selected suit uniquely Western ideals. Yet they are quasi-religious 
preconceptions, and if Sharpe is correct in saying that “the phenomenologist of 
religion must, if he is honest, confess that the enterprise on which he is 
engaged cannot but involve the subjective faculty of interpretation,”53 then 
what better preconceptions than some understanding of the religious life itself? 
 
Conclusion 
While seeming to lack any religious affiliation, personal or institutional, 
Campbell’s theoretical approach to mythology and religion presupposes certain 
ideas and attitudes that fall easily within the ambit of respectable definitions of 
religiosity itself. For this reason, he is best understood as the type of 
phenomenologist who, beyond simply admitting that the scholar’s 
                                                
51 In his elucidation of Hindu metaphysics using Kantian epistemology, for example, Campbell 
uses Kant in a way quite different to that of his predecessor in the social sciences Friedrich Max 
Müller. Where Müller wanted to extend Kant to take into account the human apprehension of the 
Infinite, Campbell argued that Kant shows the bounded nature of human understanding which 
must admit ignorance of Brahma. See Flowers, The Power of Myth, p. 49 and Garry W. Trompf, 
Friedrich Max Mueller as a Theorist of Comparative Religion (Bombay: Shakuntala Publishing 
House, 1978), p. 70. 
52 Flowers, The Power of Myth, p. 9. 
53 Sharpe, Comparative Religion, p. 248. 
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preconceptions cannot be entirely dismissed, maintained in his perspective 
on the religious and mythological something of the mystical, a-rational, 
transcendent ideas of the more self-consciously devout. Alongside Joachim 
Wach, Campbell should perhaps be likened to pioneers in the study of 
religion such as Willard G. Oxtoby who believe that a scholar’s eidetic 
vision makes the study of religion more like literary criticism, or aesthetics, 
than any of the natural sciences. Certainly, this is a fitting comparison 
given Campbell’s parallel treatment of literature and religion.54 
While a wilful acquiescence to subjectivity remains problematic, 
Campbell is not alone in taking this approach to the religious question; one 
that, if nothing else, serves to engage a secular Western audience with that 
beleaguered and controversial subject. As a scholar of religion, Campbell 
perhaps might have gained something from being more like 
phenomenologist W. Brede Kristensen and remembered that, “if our 
opinion of another religion differs from the opinion and evaluation of the 
believers, then we are no longer talking about their religion.”55 But, just as 
Campbell may have been so counselled, we ought not forget that an 
emphasis on naturalism in the study of religion is fundamentally at odds 
with religious psychology, and invites comparable problems. 
 
                                                
54 Manganaro, Myth, Rhetoric, and the Voice of Authority, p. 152. 
55 W. Brede Kristensen, Religionshistorisk Studium (Oslo: Olaf Norlis Forlag, 1954), p. 27. 
